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CIVIL RIGHTS, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION-1963
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, JR.*
Very properly, a great deal is being said and written concerning
the constitutional power of the Congress to pass legislation directed
toward improving the position of Negro citizens in the United
States. One might perhaps suppose that the subject had been
fully explored long since; that one more voice, one more pen, can
only elaborate the familiar. However, the courteous invitation of
the North Carolina Law Review to write a few pages has stilled
these doubts..
Constitutional questions surrounding all civil rights legislation
passed since 1865 have tended to divide into two categories. The
first of these concerns the effect of the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments of 1865, 1868 and 1870; the second concerns
use of other sources of constitutional power to implement the policy
of these three amendments. Taken together, the amendments pro-
claim a new and comprehensive undertaking toward Negro citizens;
and primarily to achieve this, a profound revision in the relation of
nation and states. Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott's
Case1 of 1857, insofar as it was a historical review of the attitude
of many Americans toward the American Negro in 1789, was an
accurate statement, written by a humane judge. To the sorrow of
sympathetic and perceptive men in 1857 Taney spoke the truth
concerning "the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate
race' 2 which obtained in many American states, and concerning
the legal institutions which implemented that public opinion. His
words profoundly shocked northern opinion, not because they were
false, but because they were brutally accurate. One cannot read
the Dred Scott opinion and the post-war amendments without being
struck by the correspondence between them; without realizing that
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were intended
to reform the state of affairs Taney described. The debates in the
* Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard University.
' Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2 Id. at 407.
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Congress which preceded the sweeping. Civil Rights Act of 1866,'
and the provisions of that statute, show the frame of mind of the
legislators concerning what they hoped to achieve. The first few
words of the fourteenth amendment are explicitly directed to over-
ruling the Dred Scott Case; and while the courts have given little
dispositive effect to the privileges and immunities clause of that
amendment, surely the draftsmen meant by it some substantial change
in the Negro's status, and intended that change to be a betterment.
The fifteenth amendment, probably unnecessary because of the
sweeping language of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth, nevertheless showed the particular concern of the
United States for assuring participation of the Negro people in
the political process.
Of course the fourteenth amendment was so drawn as to pro-
tect against state injustice of any sort, not racial injustice alone.
It documented a fact of national life; that we had reached the stage
where the federal government must assume a much greater degree
of control over local affairs than had previously been the case. The
whole nation was becoming close-knit by the railroads, by the
abundant production and nation-wide distribution of goods and by
the continual movement of people from state to state. The legis-
lative power which the amendment gave to the Congress is only
part of a process of extension of the powers and concerns of the
federal government which has been going on by adjudication, by
constitutional amendment and by governmental practice ever since
the Constitution took effect.
The public life of our nation sometimes moves more rapidly
than our understanding of it. For some of us, acceptance of the
profound changes brought about by the Civil War amendments has
been difficult. Another difficulty, similar and closely associated
with the first, has been realization of the sweep of the commerce
clause, of the inclusive federal control over the national economy
which it necessarily granted, and which is only in our time being
fully utilized. One reads comments suggesting that somehow the
commerce power is constitutionally usable only where the sole desire
of the Congress is to protect the movement of commodities, and
associated financial transactions; that it may not constitutionally
be used to regulate the national economy where the legislative moti-
3 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess.
1118 passi-n (1866).
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vation is to rectify social injustice or wrong. This judgment is
historically inaccurate: it reflects neither the practice of the Con-
gress nor the decisions of the Supreme Court.
For more than sixty years the Congress has usedithe commerce
power to forbid the transportation, in interstate and foreign com-
merce, of women and girls "for immoral purposes." For half a
century the Supreme Court has been upholding that use of the
commerce power; and the Mann Act4 has been sustained in cases
where the offense had no aspect of commercialized immorality.'
Surely this legislation was intended to correct some activities other
than interstate economic endeavor. Congress has constitutionally ex-
cluded lottery-tickets from interstate commerce,0 surely not because
the tickets adversely affect trade, but because the Congress deemed
lotteries evil. The Federal Kidnapping Act7 utilizes the commerce
power,' but surely its motivation is to prevent kidnapping, not to
regulate interstate travel in the interests of trade. Other examples
could be cited.
Use of the commerce power, and any other available constitu-
tional power, to correct injustice to the Negro, is supported by the
policy newly declared in the five years after the Civil War by the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. The Nation, in
its most solemn manner of public pronouncement, then announced
a revision of attitude toward the Negro; made a sort of national
act of contrition; asserted an intention to alter his status and his
life for the better. This new resolution so expressed, can and should
carry over to legislation under headings of constitutional power
other than the post-Civil War amendments themselves. The new
policy rightly should affect the attitude of the Congress and the
courts toward the use of the commerce power, the power to protect
the vote, expressed in article I of the Constitution, the war-power,
the power to tax-and-spend, and all the other exercises of national
constitutional powers.'
One may well further remember that the Congress has in the past
recognized that it may use its constitutional powers to allay wide-
spread public distress, and to remove causes of unrest which distress
has aroused. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, upheld
'18 U.S.C. §i2421-24 (1959).5E.g., Catninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
'Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 1201-to-02 (1959).
' Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
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by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1937 in the pioneering
case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,9 had a preamble
which is well worth quoting:
Section 1. The denial by employers of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure
of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of in-
dustrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing
the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of com-
merce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially
affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of
commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce;
or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such
volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods
flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the pur-
chasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions
within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and pro-
motes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these ob-
structions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.' 0
' 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
1049 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1959).
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Mutatis mutandis these findings and this statement of policy
concerning the gravity of labor unrest and disturbance in 1935, are
clearly applicable to the racial unrest and disorders which now appear
in the columns of every day's newspaper. That such disorders inter-
fere with the orderly and comfortable conduct of the national econo-
my; that they encumber "commerce among the several states,"
considered in Marshall's terms, seems undeniable. And this patent
fact has a bearing not only on the constitutional power of the Con-
gress, but also on the congressional policy which may well imple-
ment it.
We have long since passed the time when we supposed that
crossing a state border was a precondition of the effectiveness of
the commerce power." This is dramatically illustrated by the Marga-
rine Act of 1950,1" in which the Congress has prescribed the shape
of margarine of a specified color, which may be served to a customer
in a restaurant. The congressional declaration of policy in that
margarine statute is eloquent:
The Congress finds and declares that the sale, or the serving
in public eating places, of colored oleomargarine or colored
margarine without clear identification as such or which is other-
wise adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this chap-
ter depresses the market in interstate commerce for butter and
for oleomargarine or margarine clearly identified and neither
adulterated nor misbranded, and constitutes a burden on inter-
state commerce in such articles. Such burden exists, irrespective
of whether such oleomargarine or margarine originates from an
interstate source or from the State in which it is sold.18
Thus one may well approach the study of pending civil rights
legislation with a sense of the emphatic policy declaration of the
Civil War amendments; with a realization that race tensions are
disrupting ordinary life, including economic and commercial life, in
certain parts of the United States and with the knowledge that the
Congress has not hesitated to regulate entirely local economic mat-
ters when these have some relationship with interstate transactions
even as remote as those in the Margarine Act. Is the Congress
powerless to act decisively and effectively in the current racial
matters ?
" Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
"Act of March 16, 1950, ch. 61, 64 Stat. 20 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 2, 15, 21, U.S.C.).
'3 64 Stat. 20 (1950), 21 U.S.C. § 347a (1959).
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This is not an appropriate point to review in, labored detail the
-phraseology of civil rights legislation now pending before the
Congress. Quite possibly no measure now pending may reach a final
vote with its present wording. This is a time to see the contours
of the woods, not to scrutinize twigs. In this paper there is pro-
posed a discussion of four underlying questions: use of federal
constitutional powers to ensure to Negroes, or to any other racial
minority groups, access to service without regard to race in mer-
chandising establishments, restaurants, hotels, and places of amuse-
ment to which the public generally is invited, even when these
establishments are privately owned; use of constitutional powers to
assure to the Negro and to any other minority group participation
in the political process equally with all other citizens; power of the
executive to withhold federal benefits where federally financed
projects are being conducted with discrimination against the Negro;
and finally, the constitutionality of statutory provision for the
executive branch of the national government, acting through the
Attorney General, or any other executive official, to relieve the in-
dividual litigant from the burden, often intolerable, of proper en-
forcement at his own expense of constitutional and statutory rights
by costly, long and complicated litigation.
II
What of the constitutionality of an act of Congress forbidding
a store-keeper, a restaurateur, a hotelkeeper, or the proprietor of a
theatre, to refuse accommodation to a person on account of his
race? Such statutes are long familiar in state law,-a good example
is the New York Civil Rights Law, section 40, which, in part,provides,
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be en-
titled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or
amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations estab-
lished by law and applicable alike to all persons.1 4
The New York statute, originally enacted in 1895 and often ex-
tended by amendments, includes within its terms a long list of estab-
lishments,-inns, hotels, retail stores, roof-gardens, bowling-alleys,
etc. It has counterparts in many other states. The substantial ques-
" N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 40.
'1963]
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tion posed by such a statute, if passed by the Congress, would be its
inclusion within the constitutionally delegated powers. If the
present-day construction of the commerce clause in, say, agriculture,
labor, and food-drug cases were followed, there would be little
doubt of constitutionality were it not for the Civil Rights Cases"5
of 1883. One must agree that the thrust of that opinion is counter
to a "public accommodations act." But that decision should inject
no doubt if the Congress makes clear its intentions to rely on all
available congressional powers, as construed in the last quarter-
century.
The Civil Rights Cases held unconstitutional the Civil Rights
Act of 1875. This act undertook to impose civil and penal sanctions
on any person who denied on racial grounds,
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of
any previous condition of servitude.'0
The Supreme Court found that the activities in question were purely
private, having no element of "state action" in them. Hence the
fourteenth amendment had no application. As to whether the Con-
gress might have passed this law with respect to public conveyances
passing from one state to another, the Court observed that this
question was not before it; "the sections in question are not con-
ceived in any such view."17 The Court further held over Justice
Harlan's dissent that the thirteenth amendment gave no ground
for the support of the legislation.
In 1913 another plaintiff attempted to apply the act to a denial
of equal accommodations on a ship plying between Boston, Massa-
chusetts and Norfolk, Virginia.'" The Supreme Court again denied
the relief the plaintiff sought, resting its judgment on the precedent
of the Civil Rights Cases; Mr. justice Van Devanter wrote of the
Civil Rights Cases,
upon full consideration it was held [that the sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875] . .. receive no support from the power of
15109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1" Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 336.
17109 U.S. at 19.
1 Butts v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126 (1913).
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Congress to regulate interstate commerce because, as is shown
by the preamble and by their terms, they were not enacted in the
exertion of that power .... Il
In reaching its decision the Court also relied on United States v.
Reese.2" Of the Reese case the Supreme Court wrote:
That was a prosecution under a congressional enactment pun-
ishing election officers for refusing to any person entitled to do
so the right to cast his vote. The statute was expressed in
general terms embracing some acts which Congress could con-
demn and others which it could not. As to the latter it was, of
course, invalid, and the claim was made that, as the act charged
was not of the latter class but of the former, the statute should be
sustained as to acts like the one charged, notwithstanding the gen-
eral terms were in excess of the power of Congress. But the
Court held otherwise .... 21
The Supreme Court of the United States in 1960 refused to
follow Reese in an indistinguishable situation. Since United States
v. Raines2' a civil rights act is no longer invalid for all purposes
simply because circumstances can be conceived, not present in the
case at bar, in which application of the statute might be attempted
in a manner exceeding the delegated powers. Certainly, there are
many types of private establishments offering public accommodation
which "affect" interstate commerce sufficiently to fall within the
federal statutory powers. The Congress might well make clear by
the terms of the legislation that the statute is intended to apply
to any situation in which power is granted by any clause in the
Constitution of the United States, whether that power is specified
or mentioned in the statute or not. The Congress might also insert
a full separability clause, making clear that if any portion of the
statute be held unconstitutional the Congress intends that the re-
mainder shall continue in full force and effect; and that if applica-
tion of any part of the statute to any specific situation be held un-
constitutional, the Congress intends, as the Supreme Court held in
Raines that the statute shall apply to any other situation where its
application is constitutional.23 If the Court follows its construction
of the commerce power in Labor Relations Act cases, in food, drug,
10 Id. at 132.
2092 U.S. 214 (1876).
21230 U.S. at 133-34.
o362 U.S. 17 (1960).
°Id. at 24-25.
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and cosmetic cases, and in Agricultural Act cases, such new legisla-
tion would apply to a very large proportion, if not to all public
accommodations establishments.
III
The power of Congress to authorize effective federal aid to a
citizen denied voting privileges guaranteed by the fifteenth amend-
ment is no longer in doubt. United States v. Raines upheld the
power of the Attorney General to institute a civil suit for injunc-
tive relief, under such a statute, against state officers discriminating
against Negroes who desired to vote in elections.24 The right of
the Congress to substitute graduation from the sixth grade in an
accredited school for any other literacy test imposed by a state seems
to me to be equally clear. The basis for this opinion has been previ-
ously stated by me in a recent published letter which read in part :25
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES ON WHICH SUCH A
STATUTE COULD BE SUSTAINED 2 6
The most explicit clause is article I, section 4, which provides
that, ". . . the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations" * * * as to the * * * "Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives ...."
However, there is a further reservoir of power in the Congress
in the 15th amendment to, ".... enforce.., by appropriate legis-
lation" * * * the "right of citizens of the United States to
vote . ." [despite denial or abridgement] ". . . by the United
States or by any State on account of race, -color, or previous
condition of servitude."
Likewise there is a source of congressional power in section
5 of the 14th amendment which authorizes the Congress "to en-
force, by appropriate legislation * * *" the provisions of that
amendment, which include, "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
2 4Id. at 27.
" The author has taken the liberty of here reproducing, with a few minor
changes, parts of a letter which he wrote to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the United States
Senate Committee on the judiciary on Feb. 26, 1962. See note 45 infra.
" Citations which were included in the author's original text have been
removed and placed in the footnotes in standardized form. As indicated in
note 25 supra, the author has made minor changes in order that the letter
may fit better within the context of the instant article. These minor changes
have not been indicated. [Ed.]
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deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
Applicable also is the last clause of article I, section 8 of the
Constitution which gives the Congress power "to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or officer thereof."
REASON, SUPREME COURT ADJUDICATIONS, AND THE 1961 REPORT
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ALL INDICATE THAT A SIXTHE-
GRADE STANDARD WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL
This question can be approached by stating a hypothetical
Federal statute, which would impose civil or criminal liability
on any State official who should willfully apply a State "literacy,
comprehension, intelligence, or other test of education, knowl-
edge, or understanding" in such a way as "arbitrarily or un-
reasonably" to deny the right to vote to otherwise qualified per-
sons on account of race or color. Such an act of Congress is
clearly intra vires the Congress under the 15th and 14th amend-
ment clauses authorizing legislation. The Supreme Court in
Ex Parte Virginia2 7 ... sustained a Federal indictment of a State
judge for violating a Federal statute penalizing exclusion of any
man from jury service because of his race. Lane v. Wilson,28 ...
and its predecessor Guinn v. United States,29 ... upheld Federal
legislation outlawing State statutes which used the grandfather
clause as a pretext for excluding Negroes from voting. The
opinion of the Supreme Court in the Lane case includes this
significant language:
"The reach of the 15th amendment against contrivances by
a state to thwart equality in the enjoyment of the right to vote
by citizens of the United States regardless of race or color has
been amply expounded by prior decisions . . . .3 The amend-
ment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which
effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored
race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted
as to race * * " .31
More recently in Schnell v. Davis32 ... the Supreme Court
affirmed per curiam a decision of a three-judge Federal district
100 U.S. 339 (1880).
"307 U.S. 268 (1939).
"238 U.S. 347 (1915).Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915) (citations by the Court).
3 "307 U.S. at 275.
"336 U.S. 933 (1949).
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court enjoining the misuse of a State literacy test in order to
exclude otherwise qualified voters on racial grounds. Surely
the 15th and 14th amendments authorize the Congress to forbid
what they authorize a Federal court to forbid. The supposed
statute penalizing misuse of literacy tests on racial grounds in
individual cases would be clearly constitutional.
Congressional legislation appears equally constitutional when
devised not only to correct such misuse in individually demon-
strated cases, but to eliminate the whole system of State literacy
tests which Federal courts and the Civil Rights Commission
have already found, and which the Congress in the supposed
legislation would find are subject to misuse and are actually
misused to deny the vote, on racial grounds, to otherwise qualified
persons.
The Civil Rights Commission, acting under congressional
authority, was recently sustained by the Supreme Court in con-
ducting an investigation of State voting practices which may be
used to deny the vote on racial grounds to otherwise qualified
voters .... 33 That Commission, in 1961, reported:
"9. A common technique of discriminating against would-be
voters on racial grounds involves the discriminatory application
of legal qualifications for voters. Among the qualifications used
in this fashion are requirements that the voter be able to read
and write, that he be able to give a satisfactory interpretation
of the Constitution, that he be able to calculate his age to the
day, and that he be of good character.
"10. The U. S. Constitution leaves to the State the power
to set the qualifications for voters in Federal, as well as State,
elections. This power is not, however, unlimited. The 15th
amendment prohibits the States from denying the right to vote
to any citizen on grounds of race or color, and empowers the
Congress to enforce this prohibition by appropriate legislation.
Therefore, if Congress found that particular voter qualifications
were applied by States in a manner that denied the right to vote
on grounds of race, it would appear to have the power under
the 15th amendment to enact legislation prohibiting the use of
such qualifications. Section 5 of the 14th amendment similarly
empowers Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce
the provisions of that amendment. One of these provisions is
section 2 of the 14th amendment, which authorizes Congress
to reduce the congressional representation of any State in pro-
portion as citizens of that State are denied the right to vote on
any grounds other than age or conviction of crime. The effect
of these provisions of the 14th amendment may be to empower
s Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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Congress to prohibit the use of any voter qualification other than
those specified .... - 4
A State literacy test, fairly administered, would be consti-
tutionally permissible in the absence of such Federal legislation
as that proposed. .. .5 But if the (ongress finds the system
of such State tests widely misused for racial reasons, the Con-
gress can substitute its own criterion of literate voting capacity.
Congress is not without the power to forbid a system of tests
which is subject to demonstrated misuse, solely because in some
instances such a test might be fairly used.
Here, at the risk of undue repetition, one must again empha-
size the respect which the Supreme Court properly pays to acts
of Congress, and the great reluctance with which that Court
entertains any suggestion that an act of Congress may be invalid
for unconstitutionality. The House of Representatives and the
Senate are the popularly elected representative lawmaking
agencies of the people of the United States. If a sixth-grade
standard should be enacted, the statute would express the con-
sidered judgment of those two representative bodies that a fed-
erally prescribed sixth-grade completion test should be substituted
for any State exclusionary test based on literacy grounds. The
Congress would have found that this substitution was necessary
and proper for correction of a substantial arbitrary and un-
reasonable, practice, used extensively to, deny voting rights on
rgcial grounds.
Instances .are not infrequent where..the Congress has so
proscribed a whole area of State activity, though part may have
been used legitimately. Thus, for example, the National Labor
Relations Act as construed by the Supreme Court in Guss V.
Utah Labor Board36 ... displaced all similar- State labor meas-
ures affecting interstate commerce, even where the National
Labor Relations Board declined to exercise its jurisdiction and
hadnot ceded jurisdiction to the State. Surely in many instances
IState labor,, board activity -might here bebeneficial and just.
Yet, as the congressional will was interpreted by the Supreme
Court, Congres bad expressed it9, judgment in favor of uni-
formity, and the Supreme Court found no difficulty in upholding
the Act of,.Congress, forbidding good and bad' State intervention
together, in order to achieve an overall Federal goal.
Another example occurs in the field of State 'income taxation.
By act approved September 14, 1959, the States were forbidden
to impose any income tax on income derived, under stated cir-
"1 U.S. CoMM1 f ON CIVIL R;GHTS, REPORT, VOTiNG'1961 at 137 (1961).
"'See Lassiter" v. Northampton 'County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45(1959).
88353 U:S..1 (1957).
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cumstances, from interstate commerce ... .17 The legislative
history demonstrates the concern of the Congress for the national
economy, in view of at least 35 States, the District of Columbia
and at least 8 cities taxing such income by statutes or ordinances
expressing different formulas. Surely not every such tax can
have damaged the national economy; yet the Congress found
it necessary to prohibit the entire defined class. A previous tax
decision of the Supreme Court3 8 ... had upheld two such State
taxes. Yet the Congress determined to forbid a whole class of
such taxation by the act of 1959, even though some instances
might be constitutional.
The Congress has acted similarly by restricting States from
damming certain watercourses, and, on the other hand, by author-
izing Federal licenses to construct dams even where States
forbid .... In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v.
Federal Power Commission,40 ... the Supreme Court held that
Federal licensee might proceed to build a dam despite State
opposition. Undoubtedly some State-built dams would be harm-
less to the national interests; yet the Congress found it necessary
and proper to take over the control of all damming of streams
affecting interstate commerce. See for the Federal control
even of nonnavigable parts of streams under this legislation
Citizens Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission4' ....
The wide sweep of the 15th amendment in protecting the
right of citizens of all races to vote was demonstrated by the
Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwright,42 . .. in Terry v. Adams 43
... and in Gontillion v. Lightfoot44 .... As the fifth section of
that amendment gives the Congress power to enforce the amend-
ment, the congressional power is co-extensive with the amend-
ment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
45
IV
Withholding of federal funds presents other and difficult ques-
tions. A statute authorizing the President to withhold federal funds
8773 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §§381-84 (Supp. III 1962).
" Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
" Federal Water Power Act, ch. 687, § 210, 49 Stat. 846 (1935), 16
U.S.C. § 817 (1959).40328 U.S. 152 (1946).
"279 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 893 (1960).
"321 U.S. 649 (1944).
"345 U.S. 461 (1953).
"364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'
0 Letter from Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr. to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Feb. 26, 1962, printed in Hearings on S. 480, S. 2750 and S. 2979 Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 629-31 (1962). See note 25 supra.
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allotted to a state, which the state is using in an unconstitutional
manner seems not only constitutional, but in fact a restatement of a
duty which under his oath of office rests upon the President of the
United States. A state utilizing federal funds to deny equal pro-
tection of the law-for example using some future federal aid appro-
priated for public schools to maintain schools in which one racial
group is treated less favorably than another-would be an un-
constitutional misuse of those funds; the duty of any federal officer
under his constitutional oath would require him to withhold the
transmission of funds which he knew were being so used. In
reasonable caution I point out that here I am not purporting to pass
on a blanket withdrawal of all federal funds of every sort from
any state; I discuss only a known use in an unconstitutional manner
of any federal funds allotted to a state by the Congress. If such a
situation should arise, the right, and indeed the clear duty, of every
federal official from the President down, appears quite clear. The
Congress can restate what the Constitution requires.
V
The arguments in the earlier parts of this paper make clear
the appropriateness of intervention by federal officers to assure
constitutional rights, and the evident constitutionality of a statute
expressly authorizing such intervention. This paper has repeatedly
referred to United States v. Raines which, decided less than four
years ago, directly decided this question. No reason appears why
the Congress may not constitutionally authorize the Attorney
General to intervene to enforce any one of the rights guaranteed by
the thirteenth, fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, or indeed guaran-
teed by any other constitutional provision. Even if the Raines case
had never arisen, the point seems almost too clear for argument;
in any event that decision has settled the matter. The constitutional
problems are insubstantial. The question is what Congress is will-
ing to do for our Negro Americans.
1963]
